Recent Supreme Court Decisions in Personal Injury Law
In the vast majority of cases, personal injury law is governed by state law, and never reaches the level of the United States Supreme Court. However, Constitutional issues do arise in personal injury cases, particularly due process issues. Until the U.S. Supreme Court rules on these issues, states may have conflicting rules, making some states "better forums" for certain types of personal injury cases than others. Once the U.S. Supreme Court rules on an issue under the United States Constitution, that issue is settled, but it's still not as simple and clear-cut as it might sound. Often, the smallest difference in the facts of a case or the procedure followed will allow a court to "distinguish" the case and create a separate rule for that distinction. On this page, you'll find updates on some of the most pertinent recent Supreme Court decisions in the personal injury arena.
Supreme Court Denies Attorney Fees When Plaintiff Loses Permanent Injunction after Winning Preliminary
The United States Supreme Court recently denied attorney fees to a plaintiff who failed to win a permanent injunction after winning a temporary injunction. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. ____, No. 06-531 (June 4, 2007). For private actions brought under Federal statutes designed to protect civil rights, Congress allows an exception to the "American Rule" that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect [counsel fees] from the loser." Sole at 1. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). A court may, under 42 U.S.C. §1988(b), at its discretion, award attorney fees to the prevailing party.
In this case, T.A. Wyner was denied a permit by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) for an antiwar art exhibit within the John D. MacArthur Beach State Park. She intended to assemble a group of nude people into a peace sign on Valentine's Day. The DEP informed Wyner the artwork would only be allowed if her group complied with the "Bathing Suit Rule." Wyner sued the DEP, seeking an injunction against interference with the peace sign display and similar displays in the future.
Following a hastily held hearing, the District Court approved a settlement between the parties, allowing the display, provided the group stay within a temporary cloth shield. The group performed their artwork, completely disregarding the shield. Although she had almost no chance to prevail, Wyner pursued a permanent injunction. She lost, of course, but the District Court, viewing the two proceedings as discrete episodes, still awarded her attorney fees for the preliminary injunction hearing. The State of Florida appealed both the award of fees and the preliminary injunction. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held the appeal of the preliminary injunction moot, but affirmed the District Court's award of fees.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied Wyner's fee award. The Court relied on its reasoning in Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782, 792-793 (1989), quoting "[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry, is the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties . . ." Sole at 6. The Court held that the legal relationship following the permanent injunction hearing was the same as it was prior to commencing the litigation.
Wyner argued she got precisely what she wanted when she commenced the litigation: permission to create the nude peace symbol without state interference. The Court said "[t]hat fleeting success . . . did not establish that she prevailed on the gravamen of her plea for injunctive relief." Soler at 7. At the preliminary injunction phase a court only assesses the probability a party will ultimately have success on the merits. Id. Prevailing party status does not attach to receiving a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the matter. Id. Wyner was not entitled to a fee award because she only prevailed on the probability she could win a permanent injunction.
The Court did not address whether a party, prevailing in an action for preliminary injunction, may sometimes receive an award of fees when there is no final decision on a permanent injunction.
US Supreme Court Creates Confusing Punitive Damage Standard in Tobacco Case
In a recent tobacco case, Phillip Morris tried to nuance the US Supreme Court's punitive damage standards. Agreeing with Phillip Morris, the Supreme Court released a confusing opinion in Phillip Morris v. Williams (February 20, 2007), holding that a jury could use injuries to nonparties to a case to assess the reprehensibility of a defendants actions, but could not use those injuries to impose damages on the defendant.
In Williams, the jury awarded the estate of the plaintiff $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. The trial court reduced the punitive damage award, but the Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the full amount. Phillip Morris appealed.
Phillip Morris had argued to the trial judge that he should instruct the jurors that they could not impose punitive damages based on injuries to nonparties. Williams' attorney had implored the jury to "think about how many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the State of Oregon there have been." Phillip Morris asked the judge to instruct the jurors they could consider the risk of harm to others, but that they could not punish Phillip Morris for harm to anyone but Williams. The judge ultimately instructed the jury that "punitive damages are awarded against a defendant to punish misconduct and to deter misconduct," and "are not intended to compensate the plaintiff or anyone else for damages caused by the defendant's conduct."
The Supreme Court reiterated its prior rulings allowing punitive damages to be imposed "to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." Williams. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559 (1996). However, the Court also warned against arbitrary determinations of an award's amount. BMW.
In Williams, the Court held that the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injuries suffered by nonparties. The Due Process Clause prohibits punishing a defendant without first providing that individual with "an opportunity to present every available defense." Lindsey v. Normet, 408 US 56 (1972). Without notice of a nonparty's claims, a defendant cannot defend itself against a finding of responsibility, nor argue the damage award.
In regard to Phillip Morris' proposed jury instruction, the trial court had stated (1) that the US Supreme Court had only prohibited damages based on 'dissimilar' acts of a defendant, (2) that if a jury could not punish for an act of the defendant, "it is difficult to see why it may consider it at all," and (3) it is unclear to the trial court "how a jury could consider harm to others, yet withhold that consideration from the punishment calculus." The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's first statement, but clarified its prior ruling, holding that juries could not impose damages based on any of the defendant's acts upon nonparties. The Court allowed that conduct that risks harm to many is likely more reprehensible than conduct that risks harm to only a few, so a jury should be allowed to consider the risk of harm to nonparties. Finally, the Court said that state courts cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and unnecessary risk of creating confusion between considering the reprehensibility of a defendant's acts and punishing the defendant for acts upon nonparties.
In dissenting, Justice Stevens asked why a jury should be allowed to consider a defendant's causing of risk of harm to nonparties, but not be allowed to punish a defendant for creating such risk.